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This paper is devoted to the brilliant Czech logician and philosopher of language Pavel Tichý 
(1936–1994) who, after emigrating to New Zealand in 1970 and spending half his life there as a po-
litical refugee, committed suicide shortly before returning to his alma mater, Charles University 
in Prague, as Chair of the Department of Logic in the Faculty of Arts. After tracing a biographical 
profile of the Czech logician, the paper explains some of the central ideas of Tichý’s highly original 
theory, called Transparent Intensional Logic, while locating it in the wider context of the analytic 
philosophy of language. The paper concludes by highlighting the role played by Tichý’s intensional 
theory in advancing various disciplines, including artificial intelligence, with the aim of shedding 
light on the significant contributions of the Czech logician, who has yet to gain due recognition.
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This paper aims to shed light on the personality and scientific work of Pavel Tichý, 
a gifted and original Czech logician and philosopher of language, who gained world-
wide fame in the field of philosophical logic.
His personal and professional biography can be read as an example of the pressure 
and difficult conditions that intellectuals coming from Central and Eastern Europe 
were exposed to in the 20th century under the communist regime. After emigrating 
with his family from Czechoslovakia to Exeter, England in 1968, and to New Zealand 
in 1970, Pavel Tichý became Professor of Logic at the University of Otago in Dunedin, 
* Due to restrictions imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, I could not travel to 
Otago, New Zealand, to conduct research in the University archive, nor meet with Pav-
el Tichý’s wife, the writer Jindra Tichá. This paper is based on the available literature and 
a personal interview in Prague with Prof. Pavel Materna, Tichý’s lifelong friend, colleague 
and passionate supporter, in December 2019.
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where he spent roughly twenty-five years working in the field of intensional logic. 
At the end of the communist era, he was invited to return to his alma mater, Charles 
University in Prague, as Chair of the Department of Logic in the Faculty of Arts. He 
was considered in the selection process and ultimately offered the position, but be-
fore moving to Prague he commited suicide in Dunedin, on 26 October 1994.
The first aim of this paper is to trace a biographical profile of the Czech logician; 
the second is to explain some of the central ideas of Tichý’s brainchild, a theory called 
Transparent Intensional Logic (often shortened to TIL), while locating it in the wider 
context of the analytic philosophy of language. It is organised in four parts: 1) a bio-
graphical profile of the Czech logician; 2) an anecdote from 1972 that helps to re-
construct the often noted polemical feature of Tichý’s work; 3) an outline of Tichý’s 
logical approach to meaning; 4) conclusions.
1. PAVEL TICHÝ’S BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Pavel Tichý was born on 18 February 1936 in Brno.1 He spent his early years in the 
Moravian cities of Zlín and Vsetín. After finishing secondary school in Vsetín in 1954, 
he began his studies at Charles University in Prague, where he studied philosophy 
and mathematics. During his studies, he became more and more interested in logic, 
a field which lacked a significant tradition in Czech academic circles.2 
In 1961, after completing his compulsory military service, Tichý returned to the 
Charles University Faculty of Arts to work as a lecturer in the Department of Logic, 
where Professor Otakar Zich had formed a group of young logicians, including Karel 
Berka, Miroslav Jauris, Pavel Materna, Miroslav Mleziva, and Ota Weinberger. Al-
though the philosophy scene of that period in Czechoslovakia was strictly domi-
nated by Marxist ideology (whose principles Tichý, as a student and young scholar, 
accepted), the political atmosphere of the 1960s and liberalisation gave room for rela-
tively free scientific work in the field of logic. Tichý graduated in 1959, with a master 
thesis written in German and devoted to the logician Kurt Gödel: Eine Exposition des 
Gödelischen Unvollständigkeitsbeweises in der einfachen Typentheorie (‘An exposition of 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in the simple theory of types’), published in Acta 
Universitatis Carolinae, Philosophica et Historica in 1962.
During 1961–1964, Tichý worked on his doctoral thesis Vyčíslitelnost ve vztahu k teo-
riím (‘Computability and its relationship to theories’), which he successfully defended 
in 1964, and was awarded the title of CSc. (candidatus scientiarum, or ‘candidate of 
sciences’) the equivalent of a Ph.D. In the 1960s, he taught several courses on logic at 
1 As Cheyne — Jespersen — Svoboda (2004, p. 25) point out, the famous Austrian logician 
and mathematician Kurt Gödel was born in the town of Brno too. Unlike Gödel, who came 
from a German speaking community, Tichý’s mother tongue was Czech, as was the cultur-
al milieu where he spent the first half of his life.
2 The lack of a Czech tradition in the area of logic in the 1960s may seem surprising, given 
that the famous Bohemian logician, philosopher, mathematician, and theologian Bolzano 
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Charles University and wrote two textbooks: Logika pro studující na pedagogických in-
stitutech (‘Logic for students in pedagogical institutes’), an elementary textbook, and 
Logická stavba vědeckého jazyka (‘The logical structure of scientific language’), con-
taining an original presentation of the syntax and semantics of the simple theory of 
types. 
The freer political atmosphere of ‘Prague Spring’ in the early 1960s allowed 
Tichý to establish many contacts with Western colleagues. As a result, he was in-
vited by Geoffrey Keene to the University of Exeter in England. A few weeks before 
his departure, in August 1968, Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia, ending 
Prague Spring and beginning the Soviet occupation. The Department of Philosophy 
at Charles University was closed. Tichý’s reaction to this event was radical. He im-
mediately left the Communist Party, which he had joined when he was eighteen, and 
became a committed anti-communist. 
Nevertheless, he was allowed to leave for Exeter, and in 1969 he even received the 
title of assistant professor at Charles University, with the work Intension in Terms of 
Turing Machines and On the Vicious Circle in Definitions: Two Studies in Logical Semantics.
Once in Exeter, he realised it would be impossible for him to pursue an academic 
career in the ‘normalised’ Czechoslovakia, and he decided not to return. Fortunately, 
his wife Jindra and young son Petr were allowed to join him in Exeter. 
In 1970 Tichý was offered a position as a senior lecturer at the University of Otago 
in Dunedin, New Zealand, by Prof. Alan Musgrave, who had just been appointed pro-
fessor of philosophy at that university. Tichý accepted the invitation and emigrated 
with his family by ship to New Zealand, where he became Professor of Philosophy 
and Logic at the University of Otago in Dunedin in 1981. 
Thus began the most fruitful period of his professional life. His papers on logic 
started to be published in leading journals on logic and logical philosophy.3
In 1974–1976, he worked out a system of atemporal intensional logic based on the 
simple theory of types. This book, entitled Introduction to Intensional Logic, remained 
unpublished.4
In 1976 and in 1984, he visited the University of Pittsburgh and University of Ar-
izona in Tucson (United States), having been awarded two long term fellowships. 
During these visits, he had the opportunity to meet with leading philosophers and 
logicians, while presenting and defending his own work. 
3 His publications in this period include What Do We Talk About? (1975), Verisimilitude Rede-
fined (1976), A New Theory of Subjunctive Conditionals (1978), The Transiency of Truth (1980), 
and Constructions (1986). As Jaroslav Peregrin points out (1996, p. 9), his success getting 
journals to publish his work was certainly made more difficult by the fact that he often en-
gaged in sharp criticism of generally respected views in his articles.
4 One of the main reasons was that, while publishing the book in the late 1970s, Tichý came 
to the conclusion that a system of intensional logic cannot enable a satisfactory analysis 
of natural language if its apparatus is not adequately equipped to capture its temporal di-
mension. In the following years he developed a new version of his system — which I deal 
with later in this paper — in which variables for temporal moments (represented by real 
numbers) were introduced and in which possible world histories (instead of timeless pos-
sible worlds) play a crucial role in the semantic framework.
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In the years that followed he published a series of important articles, culminating 
in his 1988 masterpiece The Foundations of Frege’s Logic, in which he explains the prin-
ciple of Transparent Intensional Logic, his most important and lasting contribution 
to philosophy.
Unfortunately, the book was not as well received as Tichý had hoped, and did not 
earn him the reputation he undoubtedly deserved.5 Nevertheless, the Czech logician 
continued his work, continuing to develop his system, and in the 1990s he launched 
the project of a ‘Meaning Driven Grammar’ (MDG), whose goal was to provide a theo-
retical basis for computer-based machine translation of English sentences into a for-
mal language, based on TIL principles.
After the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, Tichý was finally able 
to return to his homeland after more than twenty years, and reunite with his old 
friends and colleagues. In 1992 he spent six months in Czechoslovakia. He was happy 
to see that Transparent Intensional Logic was known and appreciated (especially 
thanks to his old friends and distant collaborators Pavel Cmorej and Pavel Materna), 
not only among young logicians but also formal linguists and computer scientists. 
His presence gave a new impetus to TIL studies. In early 1993 he was invited to apply 
for the Chair of the Department of Logic in the Faculty of Arts at Charles University. 
He hoped his close collaboration with his Czech and Slovak colleagues and his per-
sonal influence on Czech students would transform Prague into an internationally 
recognised center of logic, from which to disseminate the logical-philosophical ideas 
to which he had devoted his life worldwide. He was offered the position and began 
planning his move to Prague in early 1995. But there were several setbacks related to 
the move that deeply upset him, and an unfortunate coincidence of events led to his 
unexpected and tragic death in a bush reserve near his home in Dunedin, on 26 Octo-
ber 1994. The cause of death was drowning, but the medical examiner was unable to 
determine the precise circumstances.6
2. PAVEL TICHÝ: A FEROCIOUS DEBATER
As professor Pavel Materna recalls, Pavel Tichý impressed him from the very begin-
ning, when he was still a young student of logic at Charles University in the 1960s. 
According to Materna, Tichý was extremely clever, accurate, and precise, and a per-
fectionist in everything he did, whether he was learning a foreign language or mak-
ing a table, debating on a philosophical matter, or writing a paper on the logical struc-
ture of sentences. 
His extraordinary sharpness as a critic of philosophy can be illustrated with an 
anecdote told on the webpage of the Department of Philosophy at Otago University: 
5 As Holster (2003) explains, the lack of appreciation and the weak critical reaction to his 
book can be explained by taking into account the unusual complexity of the formal appa-
ratus he used and the fact that his ideas were too radical to be fully understood by main-
stream logicians and philosophers.
6 The circumstances of Tichý’s suicide, as well as many details of his life in New Zealand, 
are depicted by his wife Jindra Tichá in the novel Death and Forgiveness (2015). 
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He was a tough, even a ferocious, debater and since he was also supremely clever, it 
was very difficult to get him to back down about anything. But the slightest sugges-
tion that some view of his might lend some support to paraconsistent logic would 
cause him to recoil like a vampire threatened with a crucifix. A high point of his 
career was in 1972 when Sir Karl Popper visited the Department as a William Evans 
Fellow. Popper had recently proposed a definition of closeness to truth, which was in-
tended to explicate the intuitive idea that one false theory can be closer to the truth 
than another. Tichy demolished this definition with a proof that on Popper’s ac-
count all false theories are equally far from the truth, finishing in a typically down-
right manner: ‘I conclude that Popper’s definition is worthless’. There was a pause 
as everyone awaited the response of the notoriously temperamental Popper. When it 
came it was remarkably gracious: ‘I disagree with only one word of this paper’ — its 
last word. ‘No definition can be worthless, when it provokes such a devastating criti-
cism. I hope that Dr Tichy will join me in this project, and produce a better definition 
than mine.’7 
In this case Tichý, who was allegedly never satisfied with giving purely negative criti-
cism, went on to develop a theory of ‘verisimilitude’ with his student and collaborator 
Graham Oddie. The theory, which aims at solving the problem of how the veracity of 
scientific theories can be judged, is presented by Oddie (1986) with clear and simple 
explanations of the concept of the ‘logical space’ employed by Tichý.
In the following section, I will outline the general logical approach with the aim 
of better understanding the extraordinary Czech logician. 
3. THE FOUNDATION OF TICHÝ’S THEORY
Througout all his professional life, Tichý dealt constantly with two central topics: his 
theory of Transparent Intensional Logic and his conception of constructions. He de-
veloped the first of these topics as early as the 1970s; he began to deal with the sec-
ond in the 1980s. Both constitute original contributions, and are considered ahead of 
their time. 
Let us first take a brief look at the first of these, Transparent Intensional Logic, 
which is often shortened as TIL.
3.1. FREgE’S LEgACY
As Jespersen argues, the central question that TIL aims to answer can be character-
ised as follows: ‘what it is that we know, learn, communicate, understand, and are 
otherwise intellectually related to when we know etc. a linguistic sense’ (2004, p. 9).
From the point of view of the history of philosophy, TIL can be traced back to 
the tradition of ‘objectual semantics’, generally regarded as originating with Gottlob 
Frege, the German logician, mathematician and philosopher who played a crucial role 
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mantics is to define what words mean, i.e. to specify the direct connections between 
the expressions and the things, or ‘objects of reference’, a term which is taken broadly 
to include ‘abstract objects’ such as concepts.8 
While conventional accounts of meaning considered expressions to have just one 
feature (reference, i.e. extension), Frege introduced the view in his famous essay Über 
Sinn und Bedeutung (‘On sense and reference’), published in 1982, that there are two 
levels of ‘meaning’: expressions in a language, which primarily denote what we might 
intuitively call ‘concepts’; and specific actual things, or actual values (the reference), 
which these ‘concepts’ may or may not refer to. This intuition was of paramount im-
portance for the philosophy of language and led ultimately to the development of 
intensional logics in the 20th century.9
Let’s consider the following example, presented in Jaroslav Peregrin (1996, 
pp. 17–18). According to Frege, the expressions ‘the first president of the Czech Re-
public’ and ‘the author of The Garden Party’ have the same reference (or extension), 
i.e. Václav Havel, but differ in their sense (or intension), because the first expression 
presents Havel as the first president of the Czech Republic and the second as the au-
thor of the play The Garden Party.
According to Frege, as far as sentences are concerned, they refer to a truth value, 
i.e. their extension corresponds to a truth value, while their intension is a thought. If 
we take the sentence ‘Václav Havel is the author of The Garden Party’ and we analyse 
it with the help of Frege’s predicate logic, we get the following analysis: the name 
‘Václav Havel’ refers to an individual; the predicate ‘is the author of The Garden Party’ 
indicates a function that assigns to every individual who is the author of ‘The Garden 
Party’ a TRUE truth value, and to every individual who is not the author of The Gar-
den Party a FALSE truth value; the sentence ‘Václav Havel is the author of The  Garden 
Party’ thus indicates the truth value that this function assigns to the individual 
named ‘Václav Havel’.
While being fundamentally influenced by Frege, Tichý considered his two-level 
theory to be too simple to represent the mechanism of meaning creation in natural 
or artificial languages.
8 This approach is to be contrasted with non-objectual theories of meaning, which typically 
appeal to the implicit causal processes underlying language use. As is well known, some 
philosophers interpret the meanings of expressions as mental states (for example Hume), 
or as behavioral systems of rules for the use of expressions (for example late Wittgen-
stein), even if the expressions do not explicitly refer to either such mental states or rules 
of linguistic behavior. On the contrary, objectual semantics focuses on the literal mean-
ing of linguistic expressions; it is therefore a study of the logic of meaning, rather than an 
anthropological or psychological study. Questions of how we learn, use or perceive mean-
ings are not within its scope. 
9 As far as intensional logic (also called intensional semantics) is concerned, the first works 
were published in the first part of the 20th century by Russell, Church, Gödel, Carnap, 
Tarski; later, from 1950 to 1970, a growing body of researches in this field emerged. The 
second part of the 20th century is traditionally dominated by the work of Richard Mon-
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In general terms, Tichý introduced a new level, which he called ‘constructions’, 
that aims at representing the meaning of complex expressions. According to Tichý, 
complex expressions (whether they are mathematical operations such as ‘1 + 3 = 4’, 
or natural language expressions such as ‘the red carpet’) do not directly ‘pick up’ in-
tentions, but represent ways of constructing or generating intensions from simpler 
constructions and intensions. Starting in the 1980s, Tichý started to focus on this 
constructive dimension of meaning, which was absent in Frege’s logic and other in-
tensional systems.
While Tichý’s theory is thus an ‘objectual’ one, inserted into Frege’s tradition, his 
definition and formalisiation of intensionality are deeply innovative.
Before we define ‘constructions’ (3.5.), the most relevant of Tichý’s invention, we 
will outline the essential concepts of TIL, i.e. intensions and possible worlds (3.2.), 
Tichý’s definition of logic (3.3.), and the sense of the term ‘transparent’ in TIL (3.4.).
3.2. iNTENSiONS, TiME, AND POSSibLE WORLDS
We have seen that, according to Frege, the meaning of a proposition is a truth value. 
In Tichý’s formulation of intensional theory, unlike that of Frege, it is considered that 
the truth values of typical propositions can change over time, and are generally only 
contingent: in other words, they are only the values that propositions take at certain 
times, and in certain states of affairs. If the world were different, some propositions 
would have different values to those they actually have. Thus, Tichý’s formalisation 
of the concept of intension is based on the idea of ‘possible worlds’, a concept which 
can be traced back to the German philosopher and mathematician Leibniz (1646–1717) 
and which was intensively debated in the 1960s, in the context of modern modal logic 
(Kripke 1963).10 Worlds are conceived in his theory as maximal classes of facts, includ-
ing all historical facts past, present, and future, about everything that ever happens.
Tichý’s great merit has been to formalise the notion of intensionality, proposing 
a system with a small number of explicit categories (objects): possible worlds, times, 
individuals, and truth values, enriched with a ‘lambda abstraction apparatus’.11 More-
over, he introduced explicit quantification over worlds. 
According to Tichý, to find the value of a proposition, we have to apply it first 
to a world, and then to a time in the world. For example, if we let P be a proposi-
tion, ω the class of possible worlds, τ the class of times, ο the class of truth values — 
10 It is notable that Tichý discovered intensional logic independently of Montague, and pub-
lished his first system (in English) almost simultaneously. Those who know Tichý’s work 
often regard his system as more elegant, simple and transparent from a formal point of 
view than Montague’s, although the essential idea is the same. But unfortunately for Tichý, 
his theory was first published in 1971, shortly after Montague’s papers of 1970, and he has 
received little credit for his originality (cf. Peregrin 1996, p. 16).
11 Lambda calculus (also written as λ-calculus) is a formal system in mathematical logic 
for expressing computation based on function abstraction and application using variable 
binding and substitution. It is a universal model of computation, introduced by the mathe-
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i.e. {True, False} —, then we can identify the proposition as a specific mapping, from 
worlds and times to truth values. Tichý separated this mapping into two steps: 
P: ω → (τ → ο) 
He stated that the actual truth-value of a proposition P at the present time is the ex-
tension of P, while P itself is its intension (i.e. the general mapping). So, the intension 
of a name is a function that assigns an object to each possible world. 
In short, to construct intensions, Tichý introduces a precise ontology of inten-
sional entities, which include possible worlds, times, individuals, and truth values, 
enriched with a lambda abstraction apparatus. As Jespersen (2004, p. 10) states: ‘in 
Tichý’s sense of intensionality, […] the logic in question comes with an ontology of 
intensional entities and the means to logically treat these entities’.
Having explained TIL’s intensionality, we can proceed to outline Tichý’s concept 
of logic.
3.3. ON TiCHÝ’S ‘LOgiC’
Based on Peregrin’s explanation (1996, p. 17), there were two dominant conceptions 
of ‘logic’ during the period in which Tichý was working. The first took ‘logic’ to be 
a language whose expressions have a fix and stable meaning and can be used by the 
researcher as a framework to theoretisation. This is Frege’s and Russell’s conception 
of logic, to which Tichý adheres.
The second approach, which became very popular in the second half of the 20th 
century for the study of purely symbolic systems, or ‘grammars’, started from the 
mathematician Hilbert and took ‘logic’ to be a formal system which can be modified 
by the researcher, in order to represent information. This second interpretation re-
mains common in many modern semantic theories.
Tichý was opposed to this second ‘formalist’ interpretion of logic.12 While he in-
troduced a number of formal systems to help perform logical analysis, he was not 
interested in the study of formalism for its own sake. Formal systems were only pro-
posed to help with the analysis of meaning.13 
TIL’s ‘logic’ is thus a framework that allows the researcher to make an accurate 
analysis, to compute information, to capture the ‘mechanics’ of meaning.
In the next section, we will try to define the adjective ‘transparent’.14 In which 
sense is TIL transparent? 
12 He was especially opposed to a certain dominant line of development in mid-to-late 20th 
century logic and semantics, which he calls the ‘linguistic’ tradition, examplified by such 
‘authorities’ as Quine, Montague, Kripke, Hintikka, Dummett, Kleene, Putnam, Dowty, 
Partee and many others.
13 It is sufficient to take into account the ambitious project he developed in the 90s, Meaning 
Driven Grammar, which was based on the hypothesis that form and meaning are insepara-
ble and that an adequate grammar must generate not only well-formed sentences but also 
sentence-meaning pairs in which meanings are identified with logical constructions of TIL.
14 The name TIL is intended as an allusion to Richard Montague’s ‘intensional logic’ (IL). 
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3.4. ON TiL’S TRANSPARENCY
The first interpretation of ‘transparent’ in TIL reflects the use of a symbolic system 
that shows explicitly the logical structure of linguistic expressions.15 
Contrary to Richard Montague’s semantics, Tichý seeks to explain the logical form 
of sentences with explicit reference to world-time dependencies, using abstractions 
on world-time indices.
A second, important definition of TIL’s ‘transparency’ has to do with the role of 
context. Tichý argues that semantic properties are contextually invariant, deviating 
from Frege and today’s formal semantics.16 In this sense, TIL is transparent because it 
denies that context (pragmatic or logical) in which an expression occurs contributes 
to its semantic properties. ‘Transparency’ is thus contrasted with contextualism. 
This leads us to another very important concept in Tichý’s theory: the principle of 
compositionality, which states that: The meaning of a complex expression is a function of 
the meanings of its parts, and the way they are combined.17
Tichý draws attention to the fact that simple terms are combined with each other 
to form complex terms, like in the proposition ‘the red carpet’ or in the mathematical 
operation ‘1 + 2 = 3’. In an objectual theory, such as Tichý’s, this means that objects that 
provide the meaning of simple terms can be combined with each other to generate 
other objects, which provide the meaning of a complex expression. 
15 In TIL’s symbolic system there are two main features: a system of logical types and world-
time indices (Tichý 1988, p. 202). 
16 As Jespersen points out ‘to a greater extent than does Montague’s, Tichý’s theory belongs to 
what David Kaplan once called the “Golden Age of Pure Semantics”, characterised by such lo-
gicians and philosophers as Rudolf Carnap and Alonzo Church. Pragmatic and other contex-
tual features of language are ignored. The focus is instead on all and only those a priori features 
of language that can be described in a purely logical manner. Issues like language acquisi-
tion, understanding, and communication form no part of the story’ (Jespersen 2004, p. 9).
17 This principle, originally advanced by Frege, had proven inadequate for explaining the 
contexts in which natural language expressions are ambiguous, and subsequently aban-
doned by many philosophers of language (see Carnap 1957). According to Tichý, natural 
language ambiguities were not a reason to abandon the principle of compositionality: he 
stated that a piece of natural language has to be interpreted and disambiguated. TIL’s ide-
alised language serves this task precisely. 
 He discussed in particular two contexts of ambiguity: statements about propositional be-
liefs, and ‘de dicto and de re suppositions’. Let’s briefly comment on the ambiguity showed 
by the following two sentences, each one containig a de dicto or de re supposition.
  A. ‘John met a poet’.
  B. ‘John is looking for a poet’.
 In case A the expression ‘a poet’ is used with a de re supposition (it refers to an individual), 
while in B it is ambiguous whether it features a de re supposition (where ‘a poet’ refers to 
an individual), or a de dicto supposition (where it refers to a so called ‘office’). This ambigu-
ity seems to contradict the principle of compositionality, because the term ‘poet’ seems to 
take on an alternative type of meaning in each of these contexts. But, with the use of TIL’s 
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This leads him to create the concept of ‘constructions’, which he started develop-
ing in the 1980s and which plays a central role in his theory. In the following section 
we will try to explain what constructions are.
3.5. ON CONSTRUCTiONS 
In the 1980’s Tichý seemed to recognise serious limitations in the concept of inten-
sion. The problem is that intensions alone are not capable of fully representing prop-
ositional meaning, as seen through the logic of propositional beliefs. A simple ar-
gument shows this: the intensions of any two true mathematical theorems are the 
same because a true mathematical theorem is true in every possible world and for all 
occasions. Take for instance: 1 + 2 = 3, and: 16 × 16 = 256. These are both true in every 
world and for all occasions, and hence their intension is simply the mapping from ev-
ery world and time to the value true. But many people believe that [1 + 2 = 3] is a true 
proposition without believing that [16 × 16 = 256] is true. Hence, the intensions can-
not completely represent the full ‘propositional meaning’, in the intuitive sense of 
the term, of the statement that we ‘believe one proposition but not the other’. 
According to Tichý, to serve as objects of mathematical beliefs, we need a category 
of objects which falls between propositions (construed as intensions) and sentences: 
the category of constructions appeared to him an obvious candidate.
To explain why we need constructions (or ‘higher order objects’ as Tichý called 
them), we will quote an excerpt from Tichý’s paper ‘Constructions’, where he explains 
the concept of construction by referring to a mathematical operation: 
The term ‘9 – 2’ names the number seven. It does not name it, however, in the same 
way as does either ‘7’ or ‘3 + 4’. It names it qua what results when two is subtracted 
from nine. Thus, apart from naming seven, ‘9 – 2’ also expresses a specific indirect 
way of arriving at seven; ‘3 + 4’ expresses a completely different way of arriving at 
the same number. Also ‘7’ can be regarded as presenting seven qua the result of a par-
ticular, albeit trivial, procedure: the procedure consisting in starting with seven and 
leaving it at that. I shall call such procedures constructions, borrowing the term from 
geometry […] (Tichý 1986, p. 514).
In the same passage, Tichý draws a clear distinction between constructions and ex-
pressions18:
18 Tichý extends the same reasoning to natural language expressions, stating: ‘Failure to 
distinguish clearly between entities and different ways of constructing them is an inex-
haustible source of philosophical confusion and doubletalk. The notion of proposition 
is a typical case in point. There is an almost universal tendency to impute the structure 
of propositional constructions to propositions themselves. Although few would maintain 
that the numbers nine and two and the subtraction function are ingredients of the num-
ber denoted by “9 — 2”, few will hesitate to regard Tom, Sam, and the taller-than rela-
tion as ingredients of the proposition, or state of affairs, denoted by “Tom is taller than 
Sam”. Yet the situation is completely parallel. The number seven does not contain the mi-
nus function because if it did, it would also have to contain the plus function, since sev-
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The construction that consists in subtracting two from nine is clearly something com-
pletely different from the expression ‘9 — 2’. The expression contains occurrences of 
the symbols ‘9’, ‘2’, and ‘–’, while the construction involves the entities denoted by 
these symbols, the numbers nine and two and the subtraction function, respectively. 
It is these numbers and the function themselves that are involved in the construction 
of, not their linguistic representations. The construction is also something completely 
different from the number seven that it constructs. There is clearly no sense in which 
the numbers nine and two or the minus function are parts, or constituents, of the 
number seven; but all three of them occur in the construction: they are the stepping-
stones of which this particular path to the number seven is made up (ibid., p. 515).
A construction in Tichý’s theory is thus an abstract (usually structured) theoretical 
procedure, consisting in one or more steps, for inputting and outputting objects. As 
such, it is a dimension of meaning that intensional logic alone does not describe and 
which represents the radical aspect of Tichý’s invention. As Jespersen states: 
Tichý often likens constructions to calculations. Just as an arithmetic calculation 
takes numbers, processes them and yields another number, construction are, se-
mantically speaking, calculations whose results may be, for instance, truth-values, 
truth-conditions, individuals, sets, as well as other calculations. It is important not 
to confuse procedures (calculation) with the agent-, world-, and time-bound pro-
cesses of executing the procedures or with their product (results, output) or with the 
symbolic encoding of a computer programme in a programming language (Jespersen 
2004, p. 12).
Tichý’s theory of constructions is thus an explicit theory of what is involved in the 
calculation of intensions. But how many different kinds of constructions are there? 
Can we define them all? Given that we seem to understand how to perform complex 
constructions by combining simpler constructions, Tichý proposes that construc-
tions can be defined recursively, from a few simple or primitive types, which can be 
applied to each other to build more complex constructions. 
Tichý’s main theory of constructions proposes six types of primitive construc-
tions:
(i) Variables: primitive constructions, denoted by terms like: ‘t’, ‘w’, ‘i’, ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’, 
etc. 
(ii) Trivialisation: the simplest construction, which takes an object, X, and gen-
erates the same object. This construction is written: ‘0X’. 
(iii) Composition: it corresponds intuitively to functional application; if  F is 
a function and x is an argument, we often write ‘[F x]’ to indicate the applica-
tion of F to x.
en is not only nine minus two but also three plus four. Likewise, the fact that Tom is taller 
than Sam does not contain the taller-than relation, for if it did, it would also have to con-
tain the shorter-than relation, for Tom being taller than Sam and Sam being shorter than 
Tom are surely one and the same fact’ (Tichý 1986, p. 515).
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(iv) Closure: it corresponds intuitively to what we call functional abstraction; if 
‘Fx’ expresses the application of F to x, then we can return to F itself by leav-
ing a ‘gap’ for the argument x. This construction is written as ‘– x.Fx’. 
(v) Execution: it corresponds to ‘carrying out’ or ‘executing’ a construction. The 
execution of X is written ‘1X’.
(vi) Double Execution: it is used if X ‘constructs a construction’; it corresponds to 
the execution of the latter. This is written: ‘2X’.
This small set of constructions can be applied recursively to build complex construc-
tions. Due to its infinite hierarchy of higher-order objects, Tichý’s theory of construc-
tions is quite complicated and comes at a high ontological price; on the other hand, it 
provides a framework to make accurate analysis of our judgments about logical in-
ferences, semantic relationships, and computations of information.
In a wider context, Tichý’s ‘universe’ can be seen as a reaction to the poor ontolo-
gies propagated by Quine and other nominalist philosophers, whose extensionalist 
conception of semantics, combined with pragmatics, states that only extensional en-
tities can be denoted.
Tichý’s conclusion, with his Platonic objectual theory of semantics, is opposite to 
Quine’s, and his theory enables us to understand the real processing of information 
in language.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Since Tichý’s tragic death, many steps have been taken by his colleagues and 
friends — expecially Pavel Materna, Marie Duží, Bjørn Jespersen, and many oth-
ers — to spread, develop, and apply his theory to further topics, expecially computer 
linguistics. Thanks to their work, TIL has helped to develop a variety of different ap-
proaches, including programs in artificial intelligence, computational logic, philo-
sophical logic, and new approaches to conceptual and linguistic analysis.
In a broader sense, however, Tichý’s personality, as well as his theory, are still not 
widely known, not only to the vast public but also to specialists in the field of formal 
semantics.19 
With this paper, I hope to help raise awarness on this extraordinary scholar, who, 
despite the difficulties he must have endured in writing and debating in a language 
that was not his mother tongue, succeeded in developing a theory that represents an 
advancement in the field of logical semantics, and whose advantages are yet to be 
recognised and applied. 
19 It is significant, in this respect, that the outstanding scholarly reference on modern logic 
and intensional semantics Handbook of Logic and Language (ed. van Benthem and ter Meu-
len, 1997) includes a long article on Montague Grammar written by Barbara Partee, which 
contains few acknowledgements of Tichý.
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